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Conditional Spending and The First
Amendment: Maintaining The
Commitment to Rational Liberal Dialogue
Donald L. Beschle*
I. INTRODUCTION
Questions concerning the constitutional validity of conditions placed on
recipients of government funds have a long history,' but they recently have
received greater attention as the types of constitutional concerns have changed.
Earlier cases dealt with issues of federalism, and claims that conditions unduly
limited states in the exercise of their reserved powers.2 As courts moved to
a generally consistent position of deference to Congressional choices
concerning the proper distribution of power between the states and the national
government, challenges to conditional spending faded in both their signifi-
cance and interest.'
While federalism concerns have not been entirely absent from recent
cases involving conditional spending, the impact of conditions on individual
rights has attracted more attention.4 Specifically, limits on the speech or
other expression of grant recipients have raised significant First Amendment
concerns.5 So far, the Supreme Court has found little reason to increase its
scrutiny of these conditions because of the shift from federalism concerns to
First Amendment, or other individual rights concerns. This position has
attracted significant criticism, much of it seeming to rest upon the stated or
unstated presumption that in matters pertaining to individual rights, the
government must maintain a strict neutrality.6
* Donald Beschle, Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School, B.A. Fordham
University, J.D. New York University, L.L.M. Temple University.
1. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1428-
42 (1989).
2. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (finding unconstitutional a program in
which tax revenue was distributed to farmers in return for agreements to reduce output). Butler
marked the high point for acceptance of this theory.
3. Since Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) and Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1938) (upholding conditions for participation in federal programs to assure
unemployment benefits and old age benefits against claims that they violated state autonomy),
this argument has been consistently unsuccessful. See, e.g., North Carolina ex. rel. Morrow v.
Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
4. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1433-42.
5. See infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Michael Perry's contention that denial of government funding of abortion may
not be based upon the conclusion that abortion is morally objectionable. Michael J. Perry, Why
the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on
Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113, 1115-24 (1980). Robert Kamenshine also suggests
1
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While the bare statement that the First Amendment places obligations of
neutrality on government is true, a failure to enunciate clearly just what that
neutrality may entail has led some to an untenable conclusion, namely that
the same type of neutrality called for by the Establishment Clause in matters
of religion is also required on other subjects.7 This position fails to fully
acknowledge the central commitment of the First Amendment, and less
directly much of the rest of the Constitution, to a government which will act
in a way that is both rational and liberal. This commitment demands different
types of neutrality on different questions.
The Establishment Clause demands that the government withhold its
opinion on questions which are beyond rational debate. The neutrality called
for here is a strong and consistent agnosticism. But on most questions, a
commitment to rational liberalism does not require such a position. The
government may take positions on secular values. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine how it could avoid doing so. But there are limits on the way in
which these positions may be maintained and expressed. In short, this Article
maintains that the government must take and express its opinions in a way
which is essentially rational and liberal.' That is, the government must accept
and even welcome alternative views, and be ready to engage them rather than
suppress them. It may hold beliefs quite strongly. Yet, it must be prepared
to acknowledge that these beliefs are open to the possibility of refutation and
change in light of new evidence. And, significantly, while the government
may participate in the debate on secular values, its unique position of power
places special requirements upon it to see that it does not dominate that
debate.
When these principles are applied to questions of conditions placed on
government spending, the result is neither to endorse the Court's tendency to
accept the validity of any non-coercive condition,9 nor to hold that govern-
ment subsidies may never carry restrictions on expression.'0 Instead, the
fundamental question should be whether the condition at issue is consistent
with the government's duty under the First Amendment to act as a liberal,
rational participant in the ongoing debate concerning social values.
Part II of this Article will briefly review the history of the Supreme
Court's approach to conditional spending." Part III will critique the use of
that the neutrality demanded of the government by the Establishment Clause in religious matters
should be extended to political viewpoints as well. Robert D. Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1105-19 (1979).
7. Kamenshine, supranote 6, at 1105-19. Of course, even with respect to the Establishment
Clause, precisely defining "neutrality" is not an easy task. See Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, andDisaggregatedNeutrality TowardReligion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999-1101
(1990).
8. See infra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
9. "Coercion" has been the most commonly invoked standard in these cases. See Sullivan,
supra note 1, at 1428-56.
10. See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco, Note, The National Endowment for the Arts: A Search
for an Equitable Grant MakingProcess, 74 GEO. L.J. 1521, 1534-44 (1986) (arguing against any
content-based restrictions).
11. See infra notes 14-85 and accompanying text.
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the concept of coercion as the central inquiry in such cases,12 and Part IV
will discuss the alternative approach of asking, in cases involving First
Amendment concerns, whether the condition threatens the First Amendment
commitment to rational liberal dialogue. 3
II. THE LAW OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Federalism
Challenges to conditions restricting the activity of recipients of federal
funds have a long history. Early cases focused on questions of federalism
rather than individual rights.'4 In an era in which the Supreme Court
narrowly construed the Commerce Clause and other sources of federal
regulatory power,' Congress began to use the incentives of federal spending
to further goals which could not be furthered by police power. 6
Early in the century, the Court had denied Congress the power to regulate
intrastate activity even when it had a serious effect on interstate commerce."
Thus, the Court prevented Congress from banning the products of child labor
from interstate commerce. 8 In response, Congress attempted to discourage
child labor by placing a special tax on goods manufactured by children. The
Court invalidated the tax.'9 During the early years of the Depression,
Congress again attempted to change the behavior of businessmen and farmers
through its taxing and spending powers.2" Specifically, Congress offered
cash grants to farmers who would participate in a program to reduce
acreage," and tax credits to employers who made contributions to a qualified
state fund for unemployment insurance.'
12. See infra notes 86-153 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 154-212 and accompanying text.
14. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1428-42.
15. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding Congress may not regulate
the "production" of coal); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding
Congress may not mandate a retirement and pension system for interstate railroads); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding Congress may not prohibit interstate shipment of
products of child labor).
16. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,634-38 (1938); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 573-78 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 53-59 (1936).
17. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1895) (rejecting the
government's attempt to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to thwart monopolization of the
manufacture of refined sugar. The court argued that manufacturing was a local, rather than
interstate, activity).
18. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273-77.
19. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36-44 (1922).
20. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 578-98; Butler, 297 U.S. at 68-78.
21. This program was invalidated in Butler, 297 U.S. at 68-78.
22. This program was upheld in Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 578-98, the case which
marked a significant shift in favor of recognizing broad congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.
3
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Even the most conservative justices agee that Article I gives Congress
wider authority to spend than to regulate, but when the spending consists
of grants to others who will, in turn, actually pursue the program's goals, the
line between spending and police power inevitably blurs.24 Obviously, when
the federal government provides funding for the purpose of, say, building a
highway, it may require that the funds actually go toward highway construc-
tion, rather than toward refurbishing the governor's mansion. Some level of
regulation will be not only a permissible, but an essential part of any spending
program.
At the same time, there has been a persistent sense that there must be
some limits. Whether grounded in sentiment that government should not be
able to do indirectly what it cannot do directly,s or in skepticism that there
is a real distinction between direct and indirect means,2" the notion remains
that at some point the carrot turns into the stick. And if all agree that some
types of conditions placed on grantees are valid, likewise all concede that at
least some conditions may go too far.27 The difficult task, of course, is
defining the limits.
While federalism was the chief concern of inquiries into conditional
spending, the scope of permissible conditions evolved with the scope of
congressional power under Article I and state power under the Tenth
Amendment. Sensitive to the preservation of state autonomy, early cases
made it appear that there were few permissible conditions.2" As Article I,
particularly the Commerce Clause expanded, and the force of the Tenth
Amendment receded, it appeared that only the rarest of conditions would be
held excessive.29 Although outcomes changed to the point where conditions
23. In Butler, prior to invalidating the program as involving regulation rather than spending,
the Court rejected the position taken by James Madison that the power to spend "for the general
welfare" meant only the power to spend in support of the goals enumerated in Article I. Instead,
it endorsed the position of Alexander Hamilton that "general welfare" was an independent, and
broader, term. Butler, 297 U.S. at 64-65.
24. The political debate over how much control of programs should be left to the grantees
has gone on for years. See generally Symposium: The New Federalism and the Cities, 52 J.
UB. L. 55 (1974).
25. This principle was central to the holding in Butler, 297 U.S. at 74, as well as such cases
as Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-75 (1918), and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20, 39-43 (1922) (invalidating a federal tax on products of child labor enacted after
Hammer struck down regulation in this area). Of course, with respect to federalist concerns, this
principle no longer has much practical effect. See supra note 2.
26. Even while upholding conditions on spending, the Court implies that at some point,
"temptation is equivalent to coercion," and "pressure turns into compulsion." StewardMach. Co.,
301 U.S. at 590. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). In Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court invalidated a state requirement conditioning a property
tax exemption upon the taking of a loyalty oath. The Court characterized ie exception as
"coercing the claimants" to abandon First Amendment rights. Id. at 519.
27. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519.
28. See supra notes 2, 6.
29. See supra note 3.
1120 [Vol. 57
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were cQnsistently upheld, the Court never abandoned the notion that there was
a limit, at least in theory, to the power to attach conditions to spending.3"
B. The Dole Standard
Certainly the most concise recent attempt to restate the criteria by which
the Court will measure conditions on spending was set forth in South Dakota
v. Dole.3 Congress had provided that federal highway funds would be
withheld from any state which permitted the sale of alcoholic beverages to
anyone under the age of twenty-one.32 South Dakota challenged the
restriction as a violation of state sovereignty, relying not on long discredited
views of the scope of the Tenth Amendment, but rather on the argument that
the Twenty-first Amendment placed the regulation of alcohol uniquely within
state, rather than federal authority.33
1. The Dole Test:
a. "General Welfare"
The Court upheld the restriction.34 Although the justices were not
unanimous in the outcome, they agreed that this type of dispute was subject
to a four-part inquiry.35 First, the spending involved must be in pursuit of
the "general welfare. 36 This, of course, is an easy test to satisfy; the very
fact that the program has been enacted is powerful, perhaps irrefutable
30. Occasionally, a restriction was found to be coercive and thus invalid. See, e.g., F.C.C.
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,381-99 (1984) (Courtstruck down a requirement that
broadcast stations receiving federal funds should refrain from editorializing).
31. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
32. Id. at 205. The provision is codified at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1986). At the time, South
Dakota permitted persons nineteen or older to purchase beer containing 3.2% alcohol. Dole, 483
U.S. at 205.
33. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205. Section 2 of the amendment ratifies the power of states to
establish and maintain prohibition despite its abolition by the federal government. Id. at 206.
This provision was necessary to refute the argument, often made in the late nineteenth century,
that state liquor laws interfered with interstate commerce. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100,
124-25 (1890). The amendment has been interpreted to grant the states significant leeway in
subjecting liquor sales to greater restrictions than might be permissible for other businesses. See,
e.g., New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715-18 (1981) (states have
enhanced power to prohibit non-obscene but "adult" speech on premises where liquor is sold);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106-14 (1980)
(while striking down a state program of resale price maintenance for wine as contrary to federal
antitrust law, the Court suggested that the outcome might be different if the state were acting to
further temperance).
34. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
35. Id. at 207-08.
36. Id. at 207.
5
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evidence that it seeks to promote the welfare of the community, as perceived
by the community's representatives.37
b. "Unambiguous Conditions"
Next, the condition attached to the grant must be set forth "unambigu-
ously. 38 This requirement in Dole is aimed at assuring that the potential
recipient is able to understand the choice presented and to accept or decline
the entire package, both the good (the money) and the bad (the restric-
tions).39 This clearly addresses what is often considered the key question in
the analysis of conditional spending: whether it is properly considered to be
an act of choice or coercion.4" One who has accepted benefits may object
to the burdens attached to those benefits. The most immediately appealing
rejoinder to this would be that the burdens were freely accepted. This
conception of conditional grants as essentially matters of contract leads to the
type of analysis which might be made of any agreement between parties with
some degree of inequality of bargaining power.4 Is the contract so unfair
as to be unconscionable? The existence of hidden or surprise terms is, of
course, one of the classic signs of possible unconscionability42 in a private
contract; similarly, such questions are raised in this public context.43
37. Id. ("In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public
purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress."). A footnote questions
"whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all." Id. at 207 n.2.
38. Id. at 207.
39. Id. The Court points out that this requirement "enabl[es] the states to exercise their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation." Id. (quoting Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
40. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. Ray. 1103, 1125-60 (1987); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1428-42.
41. See Robert M. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CAL. L. REv. 443 (1966). Professor O'Neil suggests that conditions placed on
welfare recipients ought to be subjected to greater scrutiny than those placed on corporations, as
welfare recipients may not be in the same position to make "reasoned choice[s]." Id. at 471-73.
This, of course, is quite similar to the type of argument which might be made in a case involving
a claim that a private contract is unconscionable.
42. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.D.C. 1965), the court
stated:
Unconscionability has generally beenrecognized to include an absence ofmeaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party .... Did each party ... have a
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important
terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?
Id. at 449. See generally John E. Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PrTr.
L. REv. 1 (1969).
43. Professor O'Neil, in discussing conditions placed on welfare recipients, stresses the
importance of adequate notice: "Some conditions are fully explained to the applicant at the time
the benefit is offered, and the consequences of a breach are made quite clear. Other conditions,
however, remain largely obscure, and the withdrawal of the benefit may catch the beneficiary
6
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Although this requirement has played little role in the resolution of litigation
challenging conditions on spending, it is theoretically significant.
c. Main Purpose Test
The third requirement is that the condition placed on the recipient must
be "directly related to one of the main purposes" of the spending program
itself." At first glance, this requirement is not self-explanatory. If the
spending program is within the constitutional power of Congress, and the goal
sought by the condition might constitutionally be sought directly, why would
linking the spending to an unrelated goal violate constitutional norms?" As
with the rule against ambiguous conditions, improper means may not be
justified by the existence of permissible ends. Here, the means used are not
deceptive, and the requirement does not resemble contract rules as clearly as
in the case of the rule against ambiguity, but the means are still troubling.
Requiring a single choice for or against two or more unrelated propo-
sitions is an improper way to make law. Many state constitutions contain a
provision that a bill enacted by the legislature may address only a single
subject.46 Such provisions seek to guard against a distortion of legislative
and popular will. In order to obtain outcome A, a voter may accept outcome
B, which if presented alone would be rejected. Thus, by controlling the way
in which questions are presented, one may gain approval of proposals that
actually lack support. And even more strikingly, since some legislators may
vote for the package for the opposite reason, that is, enthusiasm for outcome
B sufficient to override doubts about outcome A, it is possible that neither
outcome, standing alone, would command majority support.47
This 4practice of "logrolling" has long been criticized by political
reformers. Of course, unlike state constitutions, the Constitution contains
by surprise." O'Neil, supra note 41, at 473. Again, the analogy to unconscionability in private
contracts is clear.
44. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
45. The initial, and obvious, purpose of the "relevance" test is to assure that the goal sought
by the condition does not exceed the powers delegated to Congress. See Rosenthal, supra note
40, at 1131-33. If the goal sought by the condition might be sought directly, however, some
other justification must be found for the relevance test.
46. See, e.g., IAN SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 7.01-.06 (NormanJ. Singer
ed., 4th ed. 1985); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 169, 201-07 (1983).
47. The crucial significance of the way in which choices are presented to decision makers
is at the heart of "Arrow's Paradox." Kenneth Arrow demonstrated that, due to shifting
coalitions, majority voting can often lead to outcomes which actually frustrate majority will. See
Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 352-54;
Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV.
561, 561-64 (1977).
48. See generally Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42
MiNN. L. REv. 389 (1958). Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey maintain that the significance of
this seemingly trivial rule is borne out by recent scholarship in public choice theory. Daniel A.
Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 922-23
7
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no requirement that a bill confine itself to a single subject. And it might be
said that the single subject rule is unwise or unworkable in light of the
difficulty, and perhaps artificiality, of defining the boundaries of a single
subject. 9 In South Dakota v. Dole, for example, was the prohibition on the
sale of alcohol to teenagers germane to a program of highway construction
and maintenance? Justice O'Connor thought that it was not,50 but the
majority disagreed, defining the subject matter of the spending program as the
construction and maintenance of safe highways, a goal which can be seen to
include keeping highways free of intoxicated teenagers.5' Despite these
analytical difficulties, the requirement that the condition be sufficiently related
to the spending program retains a great deal of appeal. Like the requirement
that conditions be unambiguous, it indicates concern that government might
unfairly manipulate the context in which the recipient consents to the
conditions accompanying a proffered grant. 2
d. No "Independent Constitutional Bar"
The final restriction set forth by the Court is that there must be no
"independent constitutional bar" to the use of the spending power to achieve
the goal sought by the condition. 3 Here, the focus is on ends rather than
means. Unlike the first restriction, it is the end sought by the condition, rather
than that sought by the expenditure, which is at issue. The Court stated,
"Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously
discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
would be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress' broad spending power."s4
(1987). For an examination of how the rule would influence legislative response to an actual
"highly visible" and controversial enactment, see Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLimits
on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. Prr. L.
REv. 797, 800-16 (1987).
49. Williams, supra note 48, at 810. Williams states that the single subject rule is judicially
enforceable, but concedes that it "does not prevent logrolling within broad subject categories."
Id. at 810 n.56. Williams cites a seventy-year old conclusion that is still valid: "Flagrant
violations of this requirement may, of course, be apparent, but no test of violation is laid down
by the provision itself and none has been developed by judicial action." Id. at 810 n.55 (citing
W.F. Dodd, The Problem of State Constitutional Construction, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 635, 640
(1920)).
50. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 208. ("Indeed, the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of
the main purposes for which highway funds are expended--safe interstate travel.").
52. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. Although she ultimately rejects
"germaneness" as an adequate safeguard, Professor Sullivan summarizes arguments in its favor,
supra note 1, at 1470-73.
53. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209.
54. Id. at 210-11.
1124 [Vol. 57
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C. Conditions with Impact on Individual Rights
1. Art-Funding Controversy
Early cases alleging the unconstitutionality of conditional spending
pointed to the Tenth Amendment, with its reservation of power to the
states, 5 as an "independent constitutional bar."56 But a new generation of
conditions affecting individual rights are now the primary focus of this part
of the Dole test.
Two such conditions have drawn the most attention, one in the political
arena, the other in the Supreme Court. Controversy over direct or indirect
funding, through the National Endowment for the Arts,s7 of art regarded as
offensive by some because of its defiance of social norms regarding sex,5"
politics,59 or religion,' led to legislative and administrative attempts to
restrict the content of art produced by NEA grantees."' Commentators, in
both scholarly62 and popular63 journals, have argued that such restrictions
55. 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
56. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
57. For a brief discussion of the history of the creation of the NEA, see Mary Ellen Kresse,
Comment, Turmoil at the National Endowment for the Arts: Can Federally Funded Art Survive
the "Mapplethorpe Controversy?" 39 BUFF. L. Rnv. 231, 250-57 (1991). See also Lawrence
D. Mankin, The National Endowment for the Arts: The Biddle Years and After, 14 J. ARTS
MGMT. & L., No. 2, 59, 60-75 (1984). For an overview of Congressional activity affecting art
during a single Congress, see Terri L. Cornwell, Congressional Arts Caucus Legislative
Summary: 99th Congress, 17 J. ARTS MGMT. & L., No. 1, 37 (1987).
58. See generally Kresse, supra note 57; Symposium, Art, the First Amendment and the
NEA Controversy, 14 NovA. L. REV. 313 (1990). For an interesting discussion of the work of
contemporary artists such as NEA grant recipients Robert Mapplethorpe and Karen Finley, see
Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359
(1990).
59. A case not involving federal money caused significant controversy recently when a
student displayed an American flag on the floor in an exhibition organized by the School of the
Art Institute of Chicago. See Jeffrey N. Schwartz, Comment, Art, and First Amendment
Protection in Light of Texas v. Johnson, 14 NOVA L. REv. 487, 499-500 (1987). The Art
Institute was threatened with budgetary reprisals by the local government. See
Shawn Pojatchnik, Flag Uproar May Cost Art Institute Money, CHI. Tnm., June 1, 1989, at 6.
60. The most prominent example of art that was offensive on religious grounds was a
photograph by NEA-supported artist Andres Serrano depicting a crucifix submerged in a jar of
urine. See Kresse, supra note 57, at 234.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 640-47
(1980); Carrasco, supra note 10.
63. See, e.g., C. Carr, New Attack on Arts Funding: This Witch-Hunt's For You, VILLAGE
VOICE, Feb. 20, 1990, at 55; Grace Glueck, A Congressman Confrontsa Hostile Art World, N.Y.
TimEs, Sept. 19, 1989, § 2, at I (quoting First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams); Hilary De
Vries, Karen Finley Has Become a Symbol in the Struggle Over Public Arts Support, L.A.
9
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are not merely unwise, but also unconstitutional in their impact on First
Amendment freedoms.
While these specific restrictions have yet to come before federal appellate
courts, there is reason to doubt that under existing standards they are likely to
be found unconstitutional. In the 1976 case, Advocates for the Arts v.
Thomson,' the First Circuit rejected a First Amendment claim asserted
against a content-based veto of a proposed state subsidy for a literary
magazine." New Hampshire's governor was offended by aoem printed in
the magazine, which he characterized as "an item of filth."M There was no
claim, nor almost certainly could there have been, that the poem was legally
obscene.s7 Still, the court found that any decision to grant or withhold funds
for the arts must be made on the basis of content, that is, "according to the
literary or artistic worth of competing applicants."68 While the court would
prohibit discrimination against artists based upon "such extrinsic considerations
as [their] political views, 'associations, or activities," '69 guidelines limiting
distinctions among works of art themselves "do not lend themselves to
translation into First Amendment standards. 70  Despite its concession that
some enforceable limits exist, Thomson illustrates the reluctance of courts to
equate content-based decisions to withhold government funds with content-
based prohibitions on privately funded speech.7
2. Rust v. Sullivan
The second type of condition on federal spending is exemplified by the
family planning restrictions in Rust v. Sullivan.' Regulations promulgated
under the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970s
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, at 3 (quoting the artist on the chilling effect of the NEA controversy).
64. 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976).
65. Id. at 793.
66. Id.
67. Although the governor had characterized the magazine's work as consisting of
"obscenities," in court it was admitted that the work was not "obscene in the constitutional
sense." Id. at 793 n.2. The poem, entitled Castratingthe Cat, although employing words which
many would find offensive, does not deal with human sexuality at all. Id. at 798.
68. Id. at 795.
69. Id. at 798 n.8.
70. Id. at 797.
71. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-58 (1975). The
court in Thomson distinguished this type of case from content-based refusals by the government
to allow access to public forums, not only on the grounds of a "tradition of absolute neutrality"
in the latter cases, but also on the grounds that access may more easily and logically be granted
in ways that require no assessment of content at all. By their very nature, grants of funds to
artists call for some comparative judgment. Thomson, 532 F.2d at 796.
72. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
73. Title X of the Public Health Services Act, 84 Stat. 1506, (1970) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a(6) (1990)). Title X funds are to be "made in accordance with such
regulations as the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may promulgate (42 U.S.C. § 300a-
(Vol. 571126
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prohibit federally funded family planning clinics from "counseling concerning
the use of abortion as a method of family planning, '74  and from
"encourag[ing] ... or advocat[ing] abortion as a method of family plan-
ning."75  The Supreme Court rejected claims that these conditions violated
the fourth part of the South Dakota v. Dole test by infringing either the
abortion rights of the clients of these clinics, 76 or the First Amendment rights
of the clinic and its staff.
77
With respect to the right to choose abortion, the Court held that
government refusal to encourage or support the exercise of the right was
simply not the same as denial of the right.7 ' This conclusion is hardly
surprising in light of earlier cases such as Harris v. McRae79 and Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.80 These cases set the boundary of the right at
the point at which a woman may privately, without government support,
obtain an abortion."' Less obvious, however, is the relationship of the First
Amendment elements of Rust to prior law. There is a diverse and extensive
4) to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall
offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services." 42
U.S.C. § 300(a). The Act prohibits the use of federal funds "in programs where abortion is a
method of family planning." Id. § 300a(6).
74. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989).
75. Id. § 59.10(a). Title X funds are limited to "preconceptual counseling," thereby
excluding not only funding for abortion, but also prenatal or obstetric care. Id. § 59.2. But Title
X recipients refer pregnant women to agencies which do provide prenatal care. Although
recipients may refer to agencies which also provide abortions, they may not favor such providers
in their referrals. Nor may they include providers "whose principal business is the provision of
abortions" or exclude providers who do not provide abortions. Id. § 59.8(a)(3). Even upon
specific request by a client, recipients may not refer to a provider for the purpose of abortion.
Id. § 59.8(b)(5).
76. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776-78.
77. Id. at 1771-76. The Court also rejected the argument, significant in the case but not for
purposes of this Article, that the regulations were invalid and exceeded the Secretary's statutory
authority. Id. at 1767-76.
78. According to the Court in Rust:
The Government has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because
the activity is constitutionally protected and may validly choose to fund childbirth
over abortion and "implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds" for
medical services relating to childbirth but not those relating to abortion.
Id. at 1776 (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989)).
79. 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (holding that the Constitution does not invalidate a
decision to exclude abortions from those procedures eligible for reimbursement under Medicaid
programs).
80. 492 U.S. 490, 507-10 (1989) (upholding, among other things, a Missouri statute
prohibiting the use of public employees or facilities to perform abortions not necessary to save
the mother's life, even where the woman is willing to pay for the services).
81. The Rust Court considered where the line had been drawn in these earlier cases. The
Court argued that the line could be found where the government places an obstacle which would
not have been there if the state or federal government "had chosen to subsidize no health care
costs at all." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777 (quoting McRae, 448 U.S. at 317).
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body of precedent dealing with the government's power to limit the speech of
those engaged in activity directly or indirectly funded by the government.
This precedent justifies a conclusion that the government can not always
ensure that its dollars and facilities will not support expressions of dis-
sent. 2  The more notable attempts to analyze the question of unconstitution-
al conditions have taken a global approach, and attempted to produce
standards that are equally applicable whether the concern raised by the
condition is one of federalism, First Amendment rights, privacy or some other
constitutional value.83 The desire to formulate a single standard is certainly
understandable, and just as certainly has some validity. Claims that conditions
are unconstitutional will all give rise to some common inquiries. The first
three of the four tests set out in South Dakota v. Dole vary little, if at all,
depending on the particular constitutional objection to the condition.84 But
these three tests are so easily satisfied that the final inquiry takes on added
importance, and this inquiry will require careful examination of different
constitutional rights and values. Too easy an analogy between cases primarily
concerned with federalism and those primarily concerned with individual
rights may lead to entirely unsatisfactory results, primarily because of a failure
to adequately explore the particular constitutional concerns at issue in the
application of Dole's fourth test.
85
Thus, this Article will focus only on the extent to which conditional
spending may threaten First Amendment values. Of course, this will require
some reference to broader concerns posed in all conditional spending cases,
but the emphasis will be on the particularity required in Dole's fourth inquiry.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF
COERCION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
'Attempts to reduce the analysis of allegedly unconstitutional conditions
on government spending to a single question almost invariably focus on the
distinction between choice and coercion. Thus, the government will be seen
as either legitimately deferring to a choice to forego a benefit, or illegitimately
imposing a penalty on nonconforming grantees." This formulation of the
82. Note the striking contrast between Websterv. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (1989) and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Webster
dismissed the contention that the government, having established a hospital, could not exclude
certain legal medical procedures because of an explicit choice to disfavor them. Webster, 492
U.S. at 507-10. Southeastern Promotions rejected the notion that the government had unfettered
discretion to deny access to a publicly operated theatre on the the basis that the content of the
production was not "in the best interest of the community." Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S.
at 548.
83. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in
a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352-74 (1984); Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 1142-
60; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1442-50.
84. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
86. For a history of"the coercion debate," see Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1428-42. Professor
[Vol. 571128
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problem makes its outcome appear to turn on the amount of pressure felt by
the potential grantee. It is unsurprising that the application of such a test, at
least in close cases, will produce outcomes which are, in Professor Kathleen
Sullivan's words, "baffling."87 There simply is no easy formula for determin-
ing the point at which the failure to bestow a reward becomes fairly
characterized as punishment. This has been demonstrated elsewhere,88 and
those arguments need not be repeated at length here.
A. Coercion
Professor Sullivan quite correctly concludes that coercion, as a legal
concept, "is inevitably normative, not merely descriptive, empirical, or
psychological."89 In other words, an offer is properly seen as coercive when
there is some reason why it should not have been made, at least in the way it
was made.9" This leads to the question of how to recognize such an
improper offer. Sullivan reviews a number of plausible norms, based upon
philosophical concepts such as autonomy, desert and equality." Perhaps the
most famous formulation is that of Robert Nozick, who contends that a threat
can be distinguished from an offer in that the recipient of a threat would
prefer that the choice had never been presented.' The very existence of, and
need to make the choice makes the recipient worse off than before.93
B. Conditions and Constitutional Values
Nozick's notion of coercive offers is surely interesting, as are several
competing views, but they may be unnecessarily ambitious for our purposes.
One need not develop a general theory to test the moral implications of offers,
nor even to test the legal treatment of all types of offers. The only concern
here is to explore the acts of government, and while the analysis employs
moral and philosophical concepts, its purpose is to propose legal standards.
Tribe calls this "the elisive distinction between withholding a subsidy and imposing a penalty."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 781 (2d ed. 1988).
87. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1438.
88. Id. at 1428-56; see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices, 67
VA. L. REv. 79, (1981); Peter Westen, 'Freedom' and 'Coercion '--Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 588-89.
89. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1443. For an extensive defense of the position that coercion
is primarily a normative rather than an empirical concept, see generally ALAN A. WERTHEIMER,
COERCION (1987).
90. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1446. In different legal settings, "a finding of coercion
depended on some moral condemnation of the offer itself." Id.
91. Id. at 1446-50. Sullivan contends that the insight that coercion is essentially a
normative concept does not get us very far since it does not provide a set of norms to use as a
baseline measure.
92. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440 (Sidney
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
93. Id. at 463.
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Thus, the first obvious source of norms for this "inevitably normative"
endeavor will be the Constitution.
To some extent, of course, this is tautological. A condition on spending
is unconstitutional if it clashes with constitutional values. But this is merely
a starting point for the hard work of exploring just how particular conditions
may implicate particular constitutional values. Constitutional provisions at
least arguably embody the values catalogued as norms by Professor Sullivan,
and these values can be seen as possibly conflicting with government-imposed
conditions: autonomy (you may have medical care if you forego an
abortion),94 equality (government contracts are more likely to be awarded to
contractors employing minority subcontractors or suppliers);95 and desert
(you may only develop your land as you wish in return for an easement).9 6
Here, however, we will focus specifically on the values embodied in the First
Amendment.97
More than any other single provision of the Constitution, the First
Amendment commits the government to fundamental liberal values. It is
common, and to some extent accurate, to summarize the liberal commitment
as one of tolerance, a commitment made both to avoid the violence which so
often accompanies the urge to repress "untruth," and also to permit individuals
and non-governmental associations to flourish.9" But the extent to which
94. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-18 (1980).
95. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (striking down a
similar program enacted by the City of Richmond); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 443 U.S. 448, 492
(1980) (upholding government set-asides for minority subcontractors enacted by Congress).
96. See Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (striking down
a requirement that was not directly related to curing problems caused by the development).
97. See supra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
98. Thus, the classic statement by Justice Holmes:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposi-
tion.... But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.... [t]hat at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
This position, stressing the utility of tolerance in reaching the truth, goes back to the
seminal writings of liberalism. John Milton wrote "Let [truth] and Falsehood grapple: who ever
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica in
COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN MILTON 677, 719 (Cleanth Brooks ed.,
1950). John Stuart Mill wrote: "Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion
is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no
other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right." JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978). But it has long been maintained
that the promotion of truth is not a necessary condition for continuing a commitment to
tolerance. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 8 (1970). Recent
commentators stress the value of tolerance in allowing full autonomy or self-fulfillment to the
14
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tolerance completely defines the liberal commitment may easily be exaggerat-
ed. While the Enlightenment was, compared to other eras, an age of
tolerance, it is, after all, most commonly thought of as the age of reason.99
C. Rationalism and Liberalism
With three centuries of hindsight, it is easy to disparage the notion that
rational dialogue will inevitably lead to an unambiguously better world, or
reveal ultimate and unassailable truth in science, philosophy or govern-
ment.10° But that degree of faith in the "marketplace of ideas" is unnec-
essary. The framers were practical men, more skeptical and far less utopian
than their French revolutionary counterparts.'' But just as clearly, they
thought that rational dialogue was more likely to benefit society than other
individual. See generally, C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,
25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591 (1982); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). Interesting theories have been put forth
going beyond this assertion, to emphasize the importance of tolerance itself, see LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOcIETY (1986), or even the positive value of the dissenter to
society, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRiN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE (1990).
99. "Hamilton and the other authors of The Federalist subscribed to a rationalistic theory
of morality .... some principles of morality are self-evident and others demonstrable." MORTON
G. WHITE, PHIOLOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST AND THE CoNsTrrtmoN 104 (1987). See also the
discussion of the extent to which scientific rationalism underlay the Declaration of Independence
in GARY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 91-164 (1st ed. 1978).
100. This critique can take very different forms, ranging from harsh assessments of the
likelihood, let alone inevitability, of social progress, see generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, Tan
TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS (1991), to a utopianism based not on
rational progress to a static ideal, but on consistent iconoclastic choices to disrupt prevalent
patterns. See generally ROBERTO UNGER, POLITICS (1987).
101. See generally SIMON SCHAMA, CmZENs (1989). The "implicit theology" of the French
revolution, including "[flaith in the natural goodness of man, in the purity and power of reason,
in the promise of science and in the inevitability of progress," was in stark contrast to the
pessimistic views of the Puritan ethos, which itself inspired revolution. Harold J. Berman, Law
and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 569, 628 (1984). For a contrast of the
goals of the American and French revolutions and the legal means chosen to achieve them, see
Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1023 (1989).
15
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models of public decisionmaking.ce The alternative to utopianism need not
be despair or even pessimism; it may be a guarded optimism.
Thus, much of the recent debate over whether the framers sought a
government committed to Lockean liberalism or to the idea of civic republican
virtue'03 seems to miss the obvious point that one might at least attempt to
permit each to exist. 4 Faction might be tamed, but some degree of self-
interest is inevitable, and perhaps even legitimate. The government, then,
would attempt to incorporate both community welfare and individual choice;
it would be both liberal and rational.' This commitment to rationality,
coupled with the pragmatic recognition that self-interest and other non-rational
elements are an inevitable part of society, is reflected in the structure of the
government, as set out in the Constitution.
The passions of the people have their place in government, institutionally
seen most clearly at the federal level in the House of Representatives. c6
Yet, these passions are to be tamed, first by the power of a Senate and
President (who were initially intended to be somewhat removed from the role
of direct representation, and therefore more able to reflect on the common
good),'07 and then by the courts, a branch even more committed to reason
102. Despite the significant differences noted by Henkin, supra note 101, especially on
whether active or limited government is more efficacious, the similarities between the attitudes
of French and American Enlightment post-revolutionary lawmakers are significant. See Vincent
R. Johnson, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror,
and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, 13 B.C. INT'L. & COMp. L. REV. 1, 6-14 (1990).
Surely the United States Constitution, with its stated goals of "form[ing] a more perfect union,
establish[ing] Justice... promot[ing] the general welfare.. .", U.S. CONST. preamble, cannot
be seen as a pessimistic document. Madison's comment in The Federalist No. 51: "Justice is
the end of government" indicates that the means adopted by the framers were expected to lead
to ends beyond tolerant coexistence itself. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
103. See generally Richard H. Fallon, What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM.
HIST. REv. 629 (1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988); Symposium, ClassicalPhilosophyand the American Constitutional Order, 66 CHI. KENT
L. REv. 3 (1990).
104. An analysis of The Federalist shows that its authors did not discount the existence of
reason as a motive for political action. At the same time, they were realistic enough to recognize
the power of other motives such as passion and interest. See WHITE, supra note 99, at 102-28.
Much of the Constitution, then, must be seen as an attempt "to check men of dubious virtue as
well as... to encourage good and wise men." Id. at 128.
105. Id.
106. Gouvemeur Morris characterized the role of the Senate as follows: The Senate was
"'to check the precipitation, changeableness and excesses' of the House of Representatives." Id.
at 96.
107. For many of the framers, balanced government meant representation of different
classes: "Many framers envisioned creating a wealthy and aristocratic upper house capable of
checking the leveling spirit of the popular chamber." WINTON V. SOLBERG, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION XCVII (2d ed. 1990). But separation
of powers ultimately took the form of different geographic constituencies, manner of elections,
and terms of office, rather than class-based qualifications. See Edward J. Erler, The Constitution
16
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as a trump over mere desire. The extent of reason's power to check
preference will ebb and flow with the community's confidence in the idea of
reason as a means to community welfare, but the normal political process will
incorporate both a liberal recognition of the value of individual choices and
the insistence that at some point those choices be justified in rational terms.
Perhaps the most underappreciated of all constitutional doctrines is the
seemingly modest due process requirement that government acts bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate government end." 8 To be sure, this
requirement rarely serves to invalidate contemporary legislation," 9 but that
does not make the requirement unimportant. The principle that government
must justify itself by explaining what it seeks to do and why is, of course, a
requirement that government be rational."' The cautious, even deferential
way in which this requirement is applied by courts adds a liberal component
to the test. The Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York"' may
be seen as an example of a nonliberal rationalism. The Court assumed that
reason could lead only to one conclusion, and that therefore a legislative
decision contrary to the judges' own policy analysis was arbitrary."'
Holmes and the other Lochner dissenters, on the other hand, surely did not
repudiate the notion of reason."' But they saw that reason might lead in
different directions, that conclusions might change, and that a rational process
subject to change and open to argument was preferable to one resting on a
closed set of indisputable propositions." 4
and the Separation of Powers, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 151
(1987).
108. In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court stated, "If the laws passed are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied.... " Id. at 537.
109. A rare exception is Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
110. For an extensive discussion of the central role of means-ends analysis and the principle
that "the government is forced to invoke some public value to justify its conduct," see Cass R.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1695 (1984). But
see Robert F. Nagel, Rationalism in ConstitutionalLaw, 4 CoNsT. COMM. 9 (1987) (challenging
the overriding importance of rational means-end analysis.)
111. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
112. Id. The Court inquired: "Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the
public power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference... T"
Id. at 56. It also stated that "[tihis [was] not a question of substituting the judgment of the court
for that of the legislature." Id. at 56-57. The majority ultimately disposed of contrary evidence
by stating: "We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law." Id. at 61.
113. All three opinions inLochneruse a "reasonableness" standard. Thus, Holmes dissented
because "a reasonable man might think [the statute] a proper measure." Id. at 76 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan and his dissenting colleagues stated that the test was "whether the
means devised by the state are germane to an end which may be lawfully accomplished and have
a real and substantial relation to [that end]." Id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. According to Justice Harlan, "It is enough for the determination of this case, and it is
enough for this Court to know, that the question is one about which there is room for debate and
for an honest difference of opinion." Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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D. Reason and Tolerance
At the same time, the liberal commitment to limits on government will
place some questions entirely beyond the sphere of even rational politics."5
On these issues, tolerance may well be an end in itself. Permanent, intractable
disagreement is likely, if not inevitable, but the existence of such conflict does
not threaten the political community." 6 But in matters legitimately within
the public sphere, tolerance is expected to promote rational dialogue, which
will in turn lead to decisions promoting public welfare. How can we best
recognize those exceptional issues properly beyond political debate? Attempts
have been made to catalogue such issues based, for example, upon their
importance to the individual," 7 but perhaps a better approach is to focus on
the strengths and weaknesses of rational dialogue.
E. Reason and Non-Rational Beliefs
Even the most ardent advocate of rationality must concede that some
questions simply cannot be successfully approached through rational means.
This may lead one to dismiss such questions as insignificant or trivial," 8 but
this conclusion is unnecessary. What is necessary is to recognize that such
115. The classic sphere of tolerance in modem western democracies is in the area of
religion. According to one commentator:
The modem concept of tolerance developed out of the theory of religious toleration
.... Religious struggles... could not be resolved peacefully so long as the parties
insisted that the state enforce their doctrines .... Defenders of toleration believed
that political authority should be confined to the affairs of this world, and
consequently were led to narrow the scope of politics.
JOHN L. SULLIVAN ET AL., POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (1982).
116. The liberal attempt to limit the spheres in which politics holds sway has the following
implications:
Acceptance of liberal democracy may presuppose an ability of people to work out
most practical conflicts by some sort of reasoned process, but a liberal democrat's
belief in rational capacities can fall far short of any assumption that all or most
fundamental human problems have correct answers at which people can arrive by
rational deliberation.
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLMCAL CHOICE 23 (1988).
117. This type of analysis is seen in much of the long argument over which rights, if any,
are entitled to special "substantive due process" protections. Thus, as Robert McCloskey has
noted, the "demotion" of economic rights and the heightened scrutiny given to "personal rights"
in recent decades is often supported by "a group of arguments based on judgments about the
nature and relative importance of the rights concerned." Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due
Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 45.
118. It should be clear that I am using the terms "reason" and "rational" to contrast with
concepts of faith or unchallengeable authority, rather than with "empiricism." The notion that
all questions worth talking about (even religious questions) can be related to advancing human
welfare in demonstrable ways is at the heart of contemporary humanism. See Eric C. Freed,
Note, Secular Humanism, The Establishment Clause and Public Education, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1149, 1153-56 (1986).
18
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questions are inappropriate in a forum dedicated to rational discussion. This
can be conceded even by those who, quite contrary to the thorough-going
rationalist, believe that questions subject to rational analysis are less important
than the questions which resist such analysis.
Perhaps the most significant set of nonrational questions are those
concerning religion, especially those aspects of religion which transcend rules
of ethical behavior."' Questions such as the nature of God, and the
existence of heaven or hell, can be debated only by those who share a faith
that provides them with enough in the way of common beliefs and language
to understand each other.1
2 0
At least in theory, rational discussion can fruitfully take place among
those with widely diverse belief systems. They need only share common
human experiences, a common language, and an understanding of logic and
other methods of testing propositions against reality. Of course, this may
overstate the case. What we consider rational beliefs may rest to a greater
extent than we realize on unstated, unchallenged nonrational beliefs.' But
the constitutional system established by the framers seems to commit the
nation to the belief that issues in the public sphere are to be settled by rational
debate, and that such debate is possible among citizens and communities with
diverse nonrational commitments, owing to the abilities which all share, at
least potentially, as rational beings."
F. The Liberal Commitment to Neutrality
The First Amendment, with its speech and press clauses on the one hand,
and its religion clauses on the other, recognizes the importance of tolerance
as both an end and a means. Some subjects are beyond the scope of public
debate and with respect to these subjects, tolerance is required as an end in
119. The extent to which religion has been concerned with obligations in this world as
opposed to transcendent, other-worldly concerns has shifted over time. See generally Robert N.
Bellah, Religious Evolution, 29 AM. Soc. REV. 358 (1964).
120. See GREENAVALT, supra note 116, at 55. He discusses the futility of attempting to
convince someone to abandon a core religious belief on rational grounds. Persuasion requires
some common underlying beliefs, rational or otherwise.
121. This is true too of values. This is the central point in the Critical Legal Studies attack
on liberal theory. See MARK KELMAN, A GuIDE.TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 64-85 (1987).
122. According to Cass Sunstein:
For the founders, republicanism connoted a form of democratic self-determination;
a large degree of deliberation in government; political equality; and a belief that
political outcomes should reflect a capacity to think about the public good. The
framers emphatically rejected the notion that self-interest is the inevitable motivating
force behind human behavior. They did not believe that reason was always the slave
to the passions. They sought to create a deliberative democracy that was realistic
about human motivation but that sought simultaneously to encourage and provide a
place for virtue.
Cass R. Sunstein, Republicanism, Rights: A Comment on Pangle, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177,
178 (1990).
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itself."2 But most subjects are susceptible to rational debate, and will be
legitimate subjects of government action.12 Here, tolerance is an essential
means to bring about the most enlightened resolution of these questions.
Thus, in both of these contexts, the First Amendment requires the government
not to be intolerant. But what is the scope of that commitment? Some of the
more prominent attempts to identify the core value of the liberal state have
focused on "neutrality."'" Ronald Dworkin, for example, defines the liberal
state as one which is neutral on the question of what constitutes the good
life.' 26 Thus, the individual is left free to seek his or her own conception
of the good, subject only to regulation necessary to maximize the overall
ability of all to approach that goal. 27 There is much to be said for this
definition, but it can lead to serious problems if insufficient care is taken to
explore what it means to be "neutral."
One understanding of the term would see neutrality as a constant
agnosticism, perhaps even disinterest. According to this view, which is
something of a caricature, both the liberal individual and the liberal state
believe and care strongly about little in public life, except perhaps the
principle of neutrality itself. The liberal individual may have strong private
beliefs, but certainly refrains from imposing them on others, and even refrains
from attempting to convince others of their validity. The liberal state, by
definition having no private life, is denied even this outlet for strong
substantive beliefs. This caricature of the liberal individual and the liberal
state does not make either seem particularly attractive. Such a lack of
commitment to anything beyond process seems bloodless and mechanical. But
the caricature is just that. The actual belief system of the liberal individual is
more complex, and gives us insight into the permissible range of beliefs of the
liberal state. 2
8
G. Liberal and Non-Liberal Beliefs
One can believe something in at least two ways. A belief may be held
in a fundamental, permanent way, based quite consciously at least in part on
123. For the most part, this is the tolerance called for by the religion clauses. See supra
note 115.
124. John Sullivan and his colleagues make the distinction between religious toleration,
meant to remove certain questions from public debate, and political tolerance, meant to stimulate
public debate on public issues. Sullivan, supra note 115.
125. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
RONALD DwoRKIN, LIBERALISM IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (Stuart Hampshire ed.,
1978). For a vigorous argument against the proposition that neutrality is the essence of
liberalism, see generally WILLIAM GALsTON, LIBERAL PU'OSES (1991).
126. DWORKIN, supra note 125, at 127.
127. These arguments tend to go back to the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, expressed in
this way by Fred Berger: "Only to prevent harm to others may society interfere, and then only
if that conduct directly harms others." FRED R. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE AND FREEDOM:
THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 229 (1984).
128. See GALSTON, supra note 125.
[Vol. 571136
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non-rational factors.' Here the believer's commitment is beyond debate.
Contrary views are not sought out; if encountered, they are ignored or
dismissed as irrelevant or heretical. Such a belief is essentially nonliberal.
But it is not the only type of commitment which merits the designation
"belief."
Many beliefs are not irrevocable commitments, but are more provi-
sional. 3 They are open to challenge, and in the face of convincing
evidence, subject to change. The fact that something is open to challenge does
not mean that it is not a belief. Nor does it mean that the belief is weak.
Indeed, the belief may gain strength from its encounter with contending ideas.
It does not mean that the belief is unimportant; unless and until abandoned,
it may be a significant part of the believer's life, and may profoundly
influence conduct. But if open to rational debate even a strong and significant
belief or set of beliefs is entirely consistent with liberalism.
This point may best be illustrated by examining types of religious, rather
than political, beliefs. Observers of American religion have noted that, at least
in recent times, the most significant religious differences between believers
have not necessarily been linked to denomination, but rather to the gulf
between liberal and nonliberal approaches to questions of faith and mor-
als.' Some approach religion as an open-ended "quest" for meaning;
others as a commitment to a closed set of norms.132 Some see great value
in dialogue with the world and with very different religious traditions; others
reject any attempt to dilute revealed truths or particular traditions. 133
Opponents of liberal religious beliefs may see openness to dialogue and
growth as at best curious, at worst an indication of the absence of faith. 13
4
But it seems clear that open, dialogic, dynamic belief systems can serve
individuals in exactly the same way as more closed, static religious commit-
ments. They can shape behavior, provide meaning and reassurance. 13' The
liberal religionist is not without religion because he or she regards it as open
to dialogue and possible amendment. Likewise, the legal or political liberal
is not without beliefs because of a willingness to consider the possibility of
change.
129. See C. David Batson et al., Social Desirability, Religious Orientation and Racial
Prejudice, 1 J. Scl. STUDY OF RELIGION 31, 37-40 (1978).
130. Id.
131. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND
FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR 11132-214 (1988). For a discussion of how this "liberal-conserva-
tive" religious dichotomy interacts with political views, see PETER L. BENSEN & DOROTHY L.
WILLIAMS, RELIGION ON CAPITOL HILL: MYTHS AND REALITIEs 107-39 (1982).
132. See Batson et al., supra note 129, at 32-37.
133. For a suggestion that this distinction may be relevant in applying the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, see Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy and the
Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1, 8-15 (1991).
134. For a discussion of the revival of conservative American religion in recent decades, see
WUTHNow, supra note 131, at 173-214.
135. Thus, Bensen and Williams found that members of Congress took political positions
which tended to correlate with the specific conceptions they had of religion. BENSEN &
WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 140-67.
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Discussions of liberal or nonliberal attitudes often proceed as if
individuals were likely to be either consistently liberal or nonliberal in their
views. But perhaps most common is the individual who holds beliefs which
fall into both categories. One might, for example, hold liberal views on social
and political questions, but nonliberal views on questions of religion or
aesthetics. On balance, we might describe such a person as liberal, both
because we regard the areas of his or her liberalism more significant than
other questions, and because although closed to challenge on some beliefs, he
or she tolerates the existence of differing views. Thus, the liberal individual
is likely to combine a wide range of beliefs which are subject to rational
debate with some other beliefs not subject to such debate, and perhaps also a
range of questions on which no beliefs are held at all. Is the same true of the
liberal government envisioned by the Constitution?
To put it differently, must the liberal state envisioned by the Constitution
be consistently "neutral" on questions of social values, as some contend? 36
The answer will depend on what is meant by neutrality, and also on the
specific question at issue. If neutrality is defined as a consistent agnosticism,
then it is required on only certain questions, that is, those placed beyond the
proper scope of government action. The most obvious example is religion,
singled out by the First Amendment for a special kind of government
neutrality. This is clearly not surprising. Although most believers would
deny that religious belief lacks any rational basis, most would also readily
concede that religious commitment includes some nonrational elements."'
To a certain extent, then, religious arguments will be meaningful and
comprehensible only to those who share some basic beliefs. 3 If the
fundamental commitment of the constitutional system is that public decisions
will be made within a system of rational debate, one which is fully accessible
to those who share no more then the ability of all persons to carry on such
debate, then questions which demand or even permit resolution on the basis
of some special faith or gnosis should not be proper subjects of government
discourse.""
Beyond the explicit reference to religion in the First Amendment, there
are other matters which require this sort of strong neutrality in order to
preserve the processes of rational debate. The most obvious example is the
question of how citizens should vote in future elections. Perhaps the most
frequently noted example of an unconstitutional condition placed on
government spending is a condition that explicitly favors the members of a
single political party. 40 While commentators agree that such a restriction
136. See sources cited supra note 125.
137. Even the most "optimistic... natural law" tradition, that of Aquinas and subsequent
Roman Catholic thinkers, does not entirely eliminate the role of revelation and authority, See
GREENAWALT, supra note 116, at 38-44.
138. Of course, this is not to say that all, or even most, moral arguments by religiously
committed people are inaccessible to others. See id. at 69-76,
139. See supra notes 110, 121.
140. See, e.g., Thomas 1. Emerson, The Affirmative Side oftthe First Amendment, 15 GA.
L. REV. 795, 819 (1981); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565, 622-
1138 [Vol. 57
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is forbidden, their explanations of why this is so are not always clear. 4 '
Thomas Emerson comes close when he states that government may only
"speak" on government functions, and entrenching itself in power is not such
a function.' 2
Regardless of how far short the electoral process may fall from the ideal
of being a forum for rational debate, it remains the key mechanism available
to spur critique, defense and possible change of government policy. It is one
thing for individuals currently holding government posts to take partisan
positions. Such activity is probably inevitable, and is perceived by the public
as being the activity not of the state itself, but of individuals seeking
endorsement of their own and their party's positions.'43 But when the law
of the state entitles those in power to continue in power, then that law loses
the openness to change that is at the core of the rational liberal commitment.
H. Liberalism as Openness to Dialogue
Thus, neutrality in the strong sense of a consistent refusal to take a
position is required on issues not susceptible to public rational dialogue, and
on questions where government would, by taking a position, undermine the
operation of the process of rational dialogue by too closely aligning itself to
maintenance of the status quo. But this type of neutrality is not required of
government on a wide range of issues. Just as the liberal individual may hold
and express, quite strongly, a wide range of particular beliefs, so may a
government committed to liberal rationalism. However, these beliefs may not
be insulated against rational refutation. When a belief is placed beyond
rational critique, the believer has lost the right to claim that the belief is
consistent with liberalism. But at the same time, liberalism does not require
a belief to go unchallenged or criticism to stand unrefuted.'"
Examples are not difficult to find. A liberal individual might conclude,
for rational reasons, that teenage sexual activity is wrong. So might a liberal
society. 4 ' The promotion of such a belief does not, in itself, violate the
demands of liberalism. That line is crossed only if such promotion rests on
nonrational grounds, such as religious claims not susceptible to discussion with
nonbelievers, or if it takes the form of suppression of dissent or distortion of
37 (1980); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1495.
141. Professor Shiffrin states that "selective government subsidies designed to influence
elections tend to undermine respect for the political system and depart from equality in ways that
must be justified." Shiffrin, supra note 140, at 622. Professor Sullivan states that granting
benefits "only to those who joined the incumbent party's ranks obviously would pressure
constitutionally protected choices about political association." Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1495.
142. Emerson, supra note 140, at 836-38.
143. See infra note 168.
144. William Galston defends the proposition that civic education, promoting the core values
of the liberal state is both possible and desirable. GALSTON, supra note 125, at 241-56.
145. Id. at 283-86. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593-97 (1988) (discussing the
Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981).
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the process of rational discussion.' 46 Likewise, it does not violate properly
understood principles of liberal neutrality for the government to promote its
belief that a controversial historical figure, such as Christopher Columbus'
47
or Robert E. Lee, 48 should be regarded as a hero rather than a villain. But
suppression of contrary views would violate that norm. The system must be
open to the possibility that the government might change its mind on the
question.1
41
I. The Liberal Individual and the Liberal State
Both the liberal individual and the liberal state, then, will qualify for that
description not by the lack of beliefs or by an unwillingness to defend them,
but rather by the fact that beliefs are held and defended through rational
means and with a genuine willingness to change. This basic similarity does
leave room for some significant differences. The first has already been noted.
The individual, having both a private and a public life, may hold a range of
views that are nonrational and maintained in a nonliberal way, and still fairly
be described as liberal if these nonliberal views are limited to subjects which
we concede are not subject to rational debate, that is, subjects properly out of
the public sphere. The state, having no private life, enjoys no such sphere for
the nonrational. Subjects not susceptible to rational dialogue are those on
which the government must maintain consistent neutrality.
The second difference between the liberal individual and the liberal state
is, of course, the obvious difference in the power wielded by the two. This
places special burdens on the state to subject itself to more rigorous examina-
tion of the ways in which it advocates its position. In several contexts, courts
have held that even potentially deceptive speech by individuals must be
tolerated, lest valuable speech be chilled. Thus, individuals may in some cases
disguise the source of their message' and their possible selfish motives.
Generally, individual speakers have no obligation to present a balanced
146. The issue in Bowen was not whether itwas legitimate for the government to discourage
adolescent sexual activity. The issue was whether "the statute violat[ed] the Religion Clause of
the First Amendment." Bowen, 487 U.S. at 597.
147. The quincentenary of Columbus' voyage has set off a furious cultural debate over how
the explorer should be regarded. See Tim Golden, ColumbusLanded, erLooted, uh-Rewriltel,
N.Y. Timas, Oct. 6, 1991, § 2, at 1; Richard L. Kagan, The Discovery ofColumbus, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1991, § 2, at 3.
148. See ALAN T. NOLAN, LEE CONSIDERED: GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE AND CIVIL WAR
HISTORY 3-8 (1991).
149. Community attitudes toward the status of historical figures can evolve over time. See,
e.g., John Noble Wilford, Discovering Columbus, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 11, 1991, at 25.
150. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-98 (1982)
(invalidating a similar Ohio statute); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,63-63 (1960) (invalidating
a law prohibiting distribution of anonymous handbills); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460-
66 (1957) (invalidating a statute requiring the disclosure of the membership list of a controversial
political organization). But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976), for a clear
indication that not all mandatory disclosure provisions are unconstitutional.
1140 [Vol, 57
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argument.' Even outright lies may have to be tolerated, at least in the
political arena.'52
But to give the government the same leeway when it states its position
would be improper. The lapses of the individual from the liberal rational
model are to be expected and are to be remedied by the system itself. But the
government is not to be permitted such lapses. When it speaks, it must take
special care to do so in a way that does not distort the process of rational
dialogue. It is this requirement that will serve as the core for the analysis of
the constitutionality of conditions on spending.
Thus, the liberal neutrality called for by the Constitution, while requiring
the government to be strictly and consistently agnostic on a relatively narrow
range of issues, permits it to take and advocate its own beliefs on a wide
range of issues. It is recognized that there will be restrictions on the tactics
and the form of advocacy consistent with the process of rational dialogue.
And indeed, in a few cases one might go further and maintain that the
government must advocate a belief. The rational liberal values of the
Constitution itself are not, like most issues, subject to reversal, except through
the extraordinary route of constitutional amendment.'53 The availability of
a process of amendment is surely a crucial factor in assuring the liberality of
the system as a whole. The Constitution does not absolutize itself. Thus,
individuals may take positions denying the fundamental values of the
Constitution and may seek to change them. But the government itself must
adhere to constitutional values as long as they remain the basic charter giving
the government its authority. So, for example, the government not only may,
but must, advocate a belief in the fundamental equality of its citizens. It is
not an option for the government to be agnostic on the question of whether
one race is inferior to another, and of course, even less so for the government
to agree with such a position.
To summarize, we began this section with the proposition that the
question of coercion, commonly seen as the core inquiry in judging condi-
tional spending programs, is best understood not as a question involving the
amount of pressure brought to bear on the offeree, but rather as one asking
whether the offer is itself improper. Government actions are judged by the
standards of the Constitution, and it is to that document that we must turn to
judge whether an offer is proper. When the concerns raised by the conditions
placed on spending implicate the First Amendment, an offer will be improper
if it conflicts with the role of the government in the rational liberal system
envisioned by the Constitution, and given special protection by the First
Amendment.
151. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-58 (1974).
152. The Supreme Court has been quite hostile to defamation claims brought by political
candidates for attacks made during campaigns. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
272-77 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 295-301 (1971). See also
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-41 (1961)
(holding that deceptive political activity could not be the basis of an antitrust claim against a
trade association).
153. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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The First Amendment demands that the government maintain an attitude
of liberal neutrality, but this does not mean that it must never endorse or
express its opinion. Occasionally, this strong form of neutrality will be
required, but this is so only on questions where resolution demands recourse
to nonrational means, or on questions where government would, by taking
even a provisional position, seriously distort the continued functioning of a
government system open to critique and change. On a vast range of questions,
however, this degree of neutrality is not required. Rather, the government
may endorse and advocate beliefs, even beliefs which prefer one way of life
over another. These beliefs must, however, be advocated in a liberal manner.
That is, the government must engage as a participant in a dialogue in which
it is genuinely open to other views. If it relies not on the persuasive force of
rational argument, but rather on its power to manipulate the dialogue to
insulate its position from refutation, it has acted improperly. With these
general principles in mind, we return to the specific question of conditional
spending. When will conditions placed on grantees threaten this type of neutrality?
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON CONDITIONAL SPENDING:
PROTECTING LIBERAL RATIONAL DIALOGUE
As discussed above, the "coercion" which will invalidate a condition
placed on the grantee of a government spending program is best measured not
by an inquiry into how much pressure is felt by the grantee, but whether there
is something blameworthy about the offer.'54 There is nothing inherently
blameworthy about government taking a position on questions of morals or
values. Indeed, it is inevitable that the government, to some extent, will do
so. And, as law becomes more and more the primary, if not the only,
language of normative judgments shared by most of the community, such
moral judgments are likely to increase in importance. 55
Thus, suggestions that all government speech be subjected to the same
tests for neutrality imposed by the Establishment Clause with regard to
religion are unfounded.'56 However, it may be useful to borrow at least one
concept from Establishment Clause analysis to aid in assessing whether the
government has advocated its position by improper means. The most
significant analytic tool to emerge in recent Establishment Clause cases is the
154. See supra notes 86-114 and accompanying text.
155. Law may be the language of public discussion of morality but most people also
recognize that law is not an ultimate value. The tension created by this is problematic.
According to Robert N. Bellah,
[i]n the face of religious pluralism and growing doubt about the intellectual cogency
of traditional religions and philosophies, we are forced into making law our ultimate
morality and religion. However, because law has been separated from its traditional
moral and religious foundation, it cannot be viewed as our ultimate authority.
Robert N. Bellah, AALS Law and Religion Panel: Law as Our Civil Religion, 31 MERCER L.
Rv. 477, 483 (1980).
156. For the most explicit argument in favor of a reading of the First Amendment as
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concept of endorsement. 7  As developed by Justice O'Connor, this
principle holds that government violates the Establishment Clause by
conveying a message to non-believers that religious believers are, in some
sense, privileged members of the political community.'58
A. Endorsement: Religious Context
Most significant, for our purposes, is the importance which the en-
dorsement test gives to the perceptions of the audience and its focus on just
what it is that the government is saying through its acts.' s9 A religious
display on public property might run afoul of the Establishment Clause not
only when it is actually sponsored by the government,"6° but also when the
government creates the perception of sponsorship. 6' Conversely, eliminat-
ing religious speech from a public forum might convey a message of hostility
to religious ideas, 62 even if it is done in a sincere effort to be neutral.
While the type of perception which is troublesome will differ when it involves
government speech on secular subjects, the insight that what a reasonable
audience perceives may be just as important as what the speaker intends
remains valid.
Similarly, the messages communicated by the government on non-
religious subjects may be examined to see whether, in context, they com-
municate something inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to liberal
rational dialogue. A commitment to rational dialogue is not threatened by the
government expressing its own opinion on a wide range of public questions.
It surely is threatened by government actively silencing dissenting voices.
This much is widely recognized and accepted. But there are other more subtle
ways than outright distortion, by which the government may distort the
process of public debate. These methods are analogous to tactics adopted by
private speakers, and when employed by private speakers, these tactics are
often protected by the First Amendment, despite their ability to distort. This
should not mean, however, that government should be permitted the same
leeway. This is so not only because the government, as the "eight-hundred
pound gorilla" of communication, has much greater power to distort debate
157. See Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative As Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal
Neutrality and the Approach ofJustice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 175-88 (1987);
Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality TowardsReligion Under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential ofJustice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1052-59
(1986).
158. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. See id. at 688 ("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.").
160. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 622 F. Supp. 1542, 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1985),
affd, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986).
161. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-613 (1989) (invalidating
an annual display of a creche, sponsored by the Roman Catholic Holy Name Society. The creche
was exhibited in the lobby of the Allegheny County Courthouse).
162. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1981).
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than almost any private speaker, but also because the Constitution itself directs
its attention to defining the permissible range of government, not private
activity. In general, government speech on value questions should be
examined to determine whether the government has betrayed its commitment
to liberal rational dialogue. Has it attempted to undermine or distort the
process by sending a deceitful message? Specifically, there are at least two
ways in which conditional spending programs may distort the process of
rational debate. First, the government may deceive listeners about the source
of a message, unduly adding to its -legitimacy in the eyes of its recipient.'63
Second, the government may go beyond conveying its own message to falsely
convey that no dissenting views exist, or at least that such views need not be
taken seriously." '
Often, in political campaigns and elsewhere, the ability to disguise the
source of a message may prove extremely useful. A candidate may want to
disseminate negative information about an opponent while avoiding any
backlash against "mudslinging." "'5 Or, one might wish to create the illusion
of support from independent, unbiased observers, rather than have the message
discounted as self-serving." The First Amendment has been held to protect
the ability of private speakers to mask the source of their message, short of
outright misrepresentation. 7  But should government have the same
leeway?
B. Private v. Government Distortions
The government's disproportionate power to communicate its opinions is
at least partially curbed by the natural skepticism, perhaps even cynicism,
which greets government messages clearly labeled as such.'68 Whatever
qualms we may have about distortions by private speakers, these qualms yield
to a concern that such speakers may be silenced if they are required to
disclose their sources. 69 The government is .hardly likely to be silenced by
a more rigorous requirement to label its own communication honestly. If the
government may not only advocate its own position, but bolster it by
163. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 117-143 and accompanying text.
165. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 11 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). A suit was brought against
a political operative for breach of a promise of confidentiality. Id. at 2516. The defendant
leaked damaging information concerning a rival candidate to a newspaper. Id. When the source
of the story was revealed, there was a backlash against the source. Id.
166. Thus, in Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 130 (1961), the self-interested railroads campaigned against legislation favorable to truckIng
interests appearing to represent "spontaneously expressed views of independent persons and civic
groups."
167. See supra note 94.
168. "[V]oters in [an] experienced democracy quickly learn to discount many political
statements made in the context of an election." Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and
the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. Rv. 578, 584 (1980).
169. See Brown v. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. 87, 91-98 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
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deceptively making it appear to come from another source, this deception
distorts rational debate, and threatens First Amendment values.
C. Distortions in Rust
There could be no better example than the case of the family planning
clinics in Rust.7  Let us assume that Roe v. Wade,' while holding that
the government may not criminalize abortion, did not require the government
to refrain from expressing any opinion on whether women should choose
abortion or childbirth." This is no more inconsistent than the holding that
the government may urge its citizens to respect the United States flag but may
not criminalize flag desecration.'73 The government may express its opinion
in at least two different ways. First, full-time government employees, clearly
disclosing their status, might counsel against abortion and in favor of
alternatives. The message likely to be received is not merely that "abortion
is the wrong choice," but that "your government thinks that abortion is the
wrong choice."'7 As such, the message is accurate, and the expression of
such an opinion contravenes no constitutional command.
But in Rust, the government is permitted to go further. The government
exerts financial pressure on personnel and organizations perceived as
independent of the government, to deliver its message. 7  The message has
been transformed to become "Dr. X (or clinic A) thinks that abortion is the
wrong choice." This message involves two distortions. The message may be
simply false: the counselor or institution delivering the government's message
may not agree with it. And the message also unduly strengthens the
normative judgment on abortion because the listener may believe it comes
from a source free to disagree with the government. The listener, quite
170. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
171. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
172. Of course, this has not been universally accepted, but seems to be the prevailing view.
Thus, it was held that Roe did not prevent a state from making "a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion," so long as no "obstacle" was placed in the way of a woman who sought
an abortion. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). While some of the abortion cases do
suggest that the state "may not adopt one theory of when life begins" to persuade a woman to
forgo abortion, City of Akron v. Akron Cr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444
(1983) (striking down "informed consent" procedure), it seems extremely unlikely that after
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), persuasion short of coercion will
be held improper. See especially, Chief Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the preamble of the
Missouri statute. Id. at 504-07. Of course, to the extent that "informed consent" requirements
are deceptive in the ways discussed in this Article, they should be seen to pose constitutional
problems.
173. See United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310, 313-18 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 410-22 (1989). These cases surely do not suggest that federal statutes encouraging
respect for the flag, but coercing no one, are unconstitutional. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 170-187 (1988).
174. In the same way a public religious display might send not only an unadorned religious
message, but also a message that the government endorses that statement. See supra notes 100-
03 and accompanying text
175. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764-66.
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possibly already aware that the government prefers childbirth to abortion, now
believes that this "private," independent and knowledgeable actor concurs,
D. The Art-Funding Cases
The same sort of analysis may be made in cases involving government
funding of art. Surely, the government may convey its own messages through
the use of art. Few would seriously contend that in commissioning public art,
such as the Vietnam Veteran's Memorial or a statue of a historic figure, the
government may not choose to convey a message of respect for the sub-
ject.76 While this seems a rather innocuous conclusion, the fact is that such
decisions entail controversial messages. Was Vietnam a noble cause? Was
George Armstrong Custer, or even Christopher Columbus, a hero?'
Questions such as these are hotly debated, but the government's participation
in the debate need not unduly threaten the dialogue.
' This is especially so when the full message is accurately received by the
hearer. A public monument to Columbus does not merely state, "Columbus
was a hero," but, in the context in which it is displayed, states, "Your
government believes that Columbus was a hero." This latter message will be
accurately perceived, and weighed in the ongoing debate. The individual may
accept or reject the government's contention, but in any event, the source of
the message will be apparent. On the other hand, when an artist who has
received NEA funding, often through an intermediary organization,'
produces a work and displays it at a museum, gallery or theater, the context
now suggests that the message is entirely that of the artist. An attempt by the
government to shape the message now goes well beyond the government
announcing its own endorsement of a position. It appropriates the endorse-
ment of the message by the artist and incorporates it into the overall message
heard by the listener.
A second important way in which the government can distort public
discussion is by creating the illusion that dissenting voices do not exist. Of
course, if this is achieved by active suppression of private voices, it violates
clear constitutional standards."7 But the same effect might be achieved, at
least in part, through the manipulation of relationships or environments in
which the observer expects to hear a voice independent of the government.
The Constitution clearly envisions an environment in which not only the
individual, but some intermediate institutions, may maintain beliefs inconsis-
tent with those of the government, and seek to change society's prevalent
beliefs. While these intermediate institutions may not be beyond all
176. See generally 36 U.S.C. §§ 121-138 (1988) (providing for the American Battle
Monuments Commission).
177. See supra notes 148-50.
178. For a discussion of the NEA grantmaking procedures, see Kresse, supra note 57, at
261-68.
179. This is, of course, basic constitutional law. See generally, TRIBE, supra note 86, at
785-849. Tribe stresses the difference between "government's addition of its own voice from
government's silencing of others." Id. at 804-14.
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government control, at some point such control may subvert the role of the
institution as an independent source of values. Thus, the Tenth Amendment
protects states in their essential roles.80 The First Amendment protects
churches, as well as individuals, from undue interference.' Families,
likewise, receive a degree of constitutional protection. 8  Widespread
disagreement as to how far constitutional protection extends in each of these
cases does not negate the core principle that alternative sources of values are
to be protected.
E. Protection of Relationships
Relationships, as well as more formal institutions, may also demand
protection as counterweights to the voice of government."' The most
obvious example is the attorney-client relationship. Can there be any doubt
that a statute would be found unconstitutional if it required public defenders
to refrain from informing their clients of certain legal strategies or constitu-
tional rights legitimately available to them? Although the government funds
the attorney, any attempt to control his or her independent judgment is
obviously improper. But this is not because the government itself must be
indifferent as to whether the defendants invoke certain privileges. Both the
defendant and the public at large appropriately perceive the prosecutors as
non-neutral. But for the overall constitutional system to work, defense
counsel must retain their independence. Constraining that independent voice
by requiring it to echo the position of the government distorts the process by
which the individual defendant chooses to exercise or waive her rights. Such
a limit does much more than tell the defendant that the government prefers her
to waive her rights. It conveys the deceptive message that even her own
counsel, one who places paramount value on the defendant's welfare, concurs.
Similarly, what makes Rust troubling is not that the government
communicates a preference for women to choose not to undergo abortion. 84
It is troubling because the government has disturbed the process by which the
choice is made. Medical professionals are restricted in the course of
performing their traditional role, a role in which their patients legitimately
expect them to present all available medical options.' At least since
180. Of course, there is significant disagreement over the precise scope of those essential
roles, and the extent to which the amendment is amenable to judicial enforcement. Compare
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
181. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976).
182. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-506 (1977); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972).
183. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980).
184. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1764-66 (1991).
185. See principle 3 of the Patient's Bill of Rights adopted by the American Hospital
Association, which reads in part:
The patient has the right to receive from his physician information necessary to give
informed consent prior to the start of any procedure and/or treatment .... Where
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Cruzan,86 it must be conceded that medical choices have some degree of
constitutional protection; 87 the doctor-patient relationship takes on some of
the same constitutional dimensions of the lavwyer-client relationship. Examples
may be drawn from outside the context of abortion.
Current constitutional doctrine would not require the government to fund
particular types of expensive medical treatment.' Surely, a doctor
employed by the government may convey the message to patients that certain
treatments will not be funded. Indeed, the doctor might be compelled to
honestly present less expensive options to the patient. But what if the doctor
were forbidden even to discuss the existence of the more expensive treatment,
and the fact that it might be available elsewhere? Here, the government has
gone well beyond conveying its own message. It has inappropriately hidden
the existence of alternative views. Similarly, consider an attempt to prohibit
government-employed doctors from discussing with terminal patients or their
families the option of refusing or discontinuing treatment (or conversely, the
option of choosing to continue treatment in cases seen as hopeless).'89
Surely, in these contexts, the absence of government obligation to fund a
privately chosen medical procedure, and the power of the government to
convey its own message of disapproval do not validate government efforts to
distort the process by which the individual makes the choice. The government
may not deceptively lead the individual to assume that no alternatives are
available.
medically significant alternatives for care or treatment exist, or when the patient
requests information concerning medical alternatives, the patient has the right to such
information.
AMERICAN HosP. ASS'N, A PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS, reprinted in TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 336 (1983).
186. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upheld Missouri's use
of the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" to establish the desire of an incompetent
patient for termination ofmedical treatment). The case also strongly suggested that most Justices
would accord some level of constitutional protection to competent patients in their medical
decisionmaking.
187. The Court, by a vote of 5-4, held constitutional Missouri's requirement that clear and
convincing evidence be produced to sustain the conclusion that withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment was consistent with the wishes of an incompetent patient. However, the majority
conceded: "The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id. at 2851.
188. The right to abortion does not includearightto have the state fund an abortion. Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In general, there is no recognized constitutional right to state
funding of important social programs. See generally San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
189. Current federal law is quite to the contrary. Under the Patient Self-Determination Act
of 1990, all federally-funded health facilities must inform patients of their right to either accept
or refuse treatment. See Kelly C. Mulholland, Protecting the Right to Die: The Patient Self-
Determination Act of 1990, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 609, 616-25 (1991).
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F. Maintaining a Commitment to Openness
We need not choose between requiring the government to maintain strict
neutrality on social issues, on the one hand, and permitting unlimited
government action to further preferred positions, on the other. Instead, the
First Amendment should be interpreted as requiring the government to keep
the system open. The proposition that dissent may not be punished simply
because it is dissent is of prime importance. But additionally, it should be
recognized that the government's power over the process by which decisions
are made creates a responsibility that the government present its own views
without deceiving the audience as to the source of those views, or as to the
presence of alternative positions.
Where the government funds the activities of counselors and these
counselors provide information to clients who reasonably believe that the
counselors are committed to their welfare and autonomy, attempts to restrict
that commitment by requiring crucial information to be withheld are deceptive.
The case of the government-subsidized artist is somewhat less compelling, but
may also qualify as impermissibly deceptive. The audience does not have the
same degree of need for the artist's work as the client does for the services of
the lawyer or health-care professional. Still, there is a certain degree of
reliance here, an expectation that the artist is conveying his or her true
feelings.
If the government, then, chooses to subsidize a range of art that the
public perceives as representing the voice of the artists rather than that of the
government, content restrictions meant to repress certain messages may subtly
send the deceptive message that these beliefs simply are not part of the public
debate. A program of government sponsorship of art may be roughly
analogous to the creation of a "designated public forum" in traditional First
Amendment analysis.' In these cases, while the government had no
obligation to open the forum in the first place, once it does so, it may not
restrict access on the basis of the content of the message.' Thus, it breaks
no new ground to insist that when government resources are committed to
facilitate dissemination of private views, the system may not be structured to
exclude officially disapproved positions. This should be so whether the
resource is a venue or a dollar.
190. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
191. Id. at 95. ("For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."). In a variety of First Amendment contexts, it is clear that the compelling
state interest asserted must be distinct from simple disagreement with the message. See, e.g.,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (speech "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-82 (1968) (symbolic
speech with non-communicative aspects); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (words which "inflict injury or tend to incite immediate breach of the peace").
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G. Public Forum Analogy
Analogies to more traditional public forum situations are instructive..
Take the classic example of a public park."~ Surely the government may
express itself in this forum. When it does so in the usual ways, either through
speeches by public officials, or through the use of temporary displays or
permanent monuments clearly perceived as representing the government's own
speech, no threat to First Amendment values is present. But what if the
government were to fund certain private displays, and withhold funding for
others, based upon the viewpoints represented? 3 Even where the park
remains open to viewpoints contrary to the government, the subsidization is
obviously troubling. The government here has distorted public debate in two
ways. First, it has disguised the source of its own message; the message will
be perceived as coming entirely from a private, independent voice. Second,
the effect of the program will be to maximize the exposure of endorsed views
and minimize the exposure of alternatives. The audience is led to believe that
alternative views are marginal and that endorsed views have more support
outside of government itself than may be actually the case.
H. Public Libraries and Museums
The case of government subsidies to artists might also be compared to the
cases of public libraries or museums. Surely, the creation of a public library
or museum is itself a tribute to the commitment of the government to rational
liberal dialogue. That is so largely because the library is perceived as
something other than merely a source of government's own views and the
museum as something other than a repository of works extolling government.
An acquisition policy for either institution which seeks to exclude alternative
viewpoints distorts the mission of the institution. And again, the problem is
not the availability or presence of the government's own view, but the
manipulation of the environment to exclude or unduly depreciate alternative
views.
192. Limits on government control of speech which takes place on at least some kinds of
public property have been recognized for decades. Public parks have been one of the places
most often seen as protected forums. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.").
193. Even within nonpublic forums, where government may regulate with sensitivity to
content, it must not be "an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's views." Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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I Public Education
Surely there is no area in which the question of government as speaker
and regulator of messages is so prominent as in public education.'94 Yet,
due to the decentralized nature of school policymaking in the United States,
little has been said about the legitimacy of content-sensitive restrictions placed
on federal funds used for public education. More and more, however,
discussions of educational policy include some types of national standards;' 9
perhaps the most frequently mentioned linkage here is between federal aid and
some types of control over curriculum choices. 96 If a precedent is estab-
lished through relatively non-controversial requirements such as a minimum
curricular commitment to science and mathematics, it is not implausible that
conditions might expand into more controversial areas. Suppose that federal
funds to support the teaching of biological sciences were conditioned upon
recipients avoiding the subject of human sexuality, or at least certain aspects
of that topic? Suppose that a condition of receiving money for social science
programs was that any positive referenceto socialism be avoided, or even that
socialist ideas be presented as unambiguously wrong?197 The list of such
examples could go on.
These types of restrictions have been imposed as direct mandates by state
governments. Academic discussion of these state mandates has clustered
around two opposing positions. Some vigorously defend the right of the
government to use the public schools to foster generally held public val-
ues. 198 At the other extreme, some insist on something approaching com-
plete value-neutrality, perhaps within some "equal time" framework. 9 9
194. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of
'Bending' History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 497 (1987); Shiffrin,
supra note 140, at 647-53; Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Govern-
mental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. Rv. 197 (1983); Mark G. Yudof, When
tiovernments Speak: Toward a Theory of Governmental Expression and the First Amend-
ment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 874-91 (1979).
195. Former Secretary of Education Lauro Cavazos, while praising the concept of local
school autonomy, stresses the importance of "accountability": "IT]he Department of
Education is exploring ways to link positive results to increased flexibility in the use of
federal funds. In other words, grantees of a program will be given more freedom in using
those funds if they achieve better results with their students." Lauro C. Cavazos, Achieving
Our National Education Goals: Overarching Strategies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 355,
364 (1991).
196. See, e.g., Robert J. Goodwin, The Crisis in Public Education and a Constitutional
Rationale for Federal Intervention, DET. C.L. REv. 937, 938-50 (1988).
197. These are not entirely hypothetical examples. See Kamenshine, supra note 6, at
1135-36.
198. See, e.g., Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School
Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1335-57 (1976); Ernest
Van Den Haag, Academic Freedom in the United States, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 515,
516 (1963) (arguing that the concept does not apply to primary and secondary education).
199. See, e.g., Kamenshine, supra note 6, at 1015-19; Sheldon H. Nahmod, Controversy
in the Classroom; The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
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Neither of these approaches is fully consistent with the obligations of a
government committed to rational liberalism. The government may maintain
and express beliefs, but only within the framework of rational liberalism, that
is, with a recognition that alternative voices exist. The government must be
willing to engage those voices in discussion, and accept the possibility that
current beliefs may change.
Public education should avoid both indoctrination and complete
skepticism. Community beliefs, on subjects appropriate for rational secular
debate, should not merely be recited and memorized, but discussed and
explored." 0 This principle will surely not be as easy to implement as either
of its two more determinate alternatives. The fact that time and resources are
limited means that certain questions have to be addressed. When are
alternatives sufficiently significant to warrant discussion? How much time
should each alternative deserve? But these questions, however difficult, are
not entirely new to the legal system.
In Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court has held it imper-
missible for a state either to ban the teaching of evolutionary theory,20? or
to require the presentation of creationist theories generally rejected by
science.2' In cases addressing policies set by public school or community
libraries, the Court has held that while the First Amendment does not require
the acquisition of any particular book, it may well prevent the removal of
books already acquired from the shelves due to objection to their content.03
While these cases have received their share of criticism,' ° they do seem to
reflect at least a roughly accurate intuition with respect to the obligations of
the government as teacher.
The cases on evolution and creationism may be seen to prohibit different
types of deception in public education. To deprive students of awareness of
generally accepted scientific theories because these theories are offensive to
much of the community seems inconsistent with First Amendment values even
REV. 1032, 1042-50 (1971).
200. One commentator has stated:
[The] right to know approach countermands the view that school boards have the
authority to inculcate the young. If students have a right to receive information,
school boards have an obligation to provide them with information that may
significantly undermine official efforts to inculcate the young with particular
values, ideas, beliefs, attitudes and dispositions.
van Geel, supra note 194, at 213.
201. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1968).
202. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987).
203. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 854, 863-72 (1982).
204. For an overview of the history of the evolution-creationist debates since the 1920s,
see Judith A. Villareal, Note, God and Darwin in the Classroom: The Creation-Evolution
Controversy, 64 Ci.-KENr. L. REv. 335, 33949 (1988). See also James S. Hanre, The Creationist-
Evolutionist Debate and the Public Schools, 33 J. CHURCH & STAT 765, 768-81 (1991). On
the subject of school libraries, see generally Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the
Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527 (1984).
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where such suppression is not motivated by religious concerns." 5 The rational
liberal individual, as well as the rational liberal society, while free to debate,
contest and even ultimately reject prevailing scientific thought does not hide
from it. The creationism dispute is somewhat more complex. If taken, as it
is by some, 21 to preclude criticism of mainstream evolutionary theory, then
the Court's decision does not genuinely promote First Amendment values.
But a careful reading of the case indicates that the Court saw itself as again
stepping in to correct a distortion of the debate.2 7 This time, the distortion
took the form not of exclusion of an idea, but rather of a requirement that one
position be allocated much more attention and respect than the position can
command in the free market of ideas. 8
It would hardly be realistic to require detailed judicial oversight of the
precise amount of attention which contending ideas deserve. Deference should
be given to decisions which appear to reflect a good faith effort to present and
evaluate issues openly and fairly. But occasionally, as in the cases involving
the evolution-creationism question, a decision will be so inconsistent with such
an effort that judicial intervention may be appropriate. In much the same way
that the question of what message government is seen to endorse has become
205. Perhaps the most prominent example was the insistence of Soviet leaders that
scientific conclusions be consistent with Marxist thought. Lenin
"pointed out that the crisis in physics could be overcome by mastering the science
of dialectical materialism. This provided a sure way for physics to surmount
every kind of crisis and develop further." As a result, it is supposed to be the
obligation of Soviet physicists to take the dialectic as their guide not only in their
approach to politics and philosophy, but also to physics, itself.
DON K. PRICE, THE SCIENTI iC ESTATE 8 (1965) (quoting S.I. VAvILOv, LENIN AND THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN PHYSICS 12, 32 (1953)).
206. The dissenters in Aguillard find it plausible that Louisiana's Balanced Treatment
Act was not intended to indoctrinate, but to make students
free to decide for themselves, based upon a fair presentation of the scientific
evidence, about the origin of life.... The people of Louisiana ... are quite
entitled, as a secular matter, to have whatever scientific evidence there may be
against evolution presented in their schools....
Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 631, 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. 'The Act actually serves to diminish academic freedom by removing the flexibility
to teach evolution without also teaching creation science, even if teachers determine that such
curriculum results in less effective and comprehensive science instruction." Id. at 586 n.6.
For a scientist's views on Aguillard, see STEPHEN J. GOULD, JUSTICE SCALIA's MISUNDER-
STANDING IN BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 448-60
(1991).
208. Professor Gottlieb discusses at some length the difficult question of whether an
issue or a particular view is entitled to recognition within a school curriculum, and, if so,
how much attention it deserves. He does this by analogizing to the FCC's "fairness doc-
trine," Gottlieb, supra note 194, at 553-73. "Offering arguments generally regarded as weak
by historians 'equal time' with more widely endorsed positions may distort public debate and
give students a false impression that all or most questions are simply unanswerable." Id. at
568.
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central to the resolution of Establishment Clause cases, 9 so might the
question of endorsement control here. But rather than asking whether the
government has endorsed one side of a question or another (which is properly
the subject of secular public debate), the question will be whether the
government has impermissibly endorsed indoctrination or deception over
rational argument.
As in Establishment Clause cases, the question of endorsement does not
lend itself to the development of specific rules, but in particular instances
application of the test is certainly within the competence of courts.
Consider the question of book selection by public or school libraries. Judge
Jon Newman has noted that while the decision to remove a book from the
shelves has the same obvious effect as the decision not to acquire the book in
the first place, on another level the decisions send quite different messag-
es.21' A decision not to acquire a particular book can so easily be, and
appear to be, a consequence of benign motives such as limited resources, that
without much more evidence it does not send a message that the ideas
contained in the book should be suppressed."2 On the other hand, unless.
done for reasons such as lack of shelf space, the act of discarding a book,
especially in response to outside pressure, sends precisely that message. We
see, then, that current law, which avoids bright-line rules on library policy but
which subjects acquisition policies to less scrutiny than decisions to remove
books is entirely correct. Through its library policy, as well as through its
other activities, the government must avoid endorsement of the notion that the
proper response to controversial ideas is to suppress them rather than to
engage and perhaps refute them.
V. CONCLUSION
Conditions placed upon government funds raise First Amendment
concerns and discussions of the validity of these conditions have suffered from
a failure to differentiate the kinds of neutrality required of a government
committed to liberal and rational values. Unlike religion, questions of secular
values do not demand that government refrain from endorsing or advocating
one particular position. Rather, the question is whether government has used
illiberal means to secure agreement with those positions. Such methods,
including not only coercion, but also deception and the exclusion of alternative
views from public dialogue, conflict with the core values underlying the First
Amendment.
209. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
210. That outcomes might be uncertain is not necessarily a fatal flaw. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, responding to objections that his "clear and present danger" approach to First
Amendment issues was indeterminate stated that that "is an objection to pretty much the
whole body of the law, which for thirty years I have made my brethren smile by insisting to
be everywhere a matter of degree." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski,
reprinted in I HoLMES-LAsKI LETrERS 152-53 (M. Howe ed., 1963).
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Thus, restrictions on the content of government-assisted art, on com-
munication between clients and government-supported counselors, on the
content of public school curricula and extracurricular activities and the policies
of public school and community libraries all require the same type of analysis.
Aside from the narrow range of issues on which the government may not
speak, such as religion, has government openly and honestly expressed its
view? Has it acted deceptively by disguising its own voice so that it is
perceived to be someone else's? Has it structured a relationship or an
environment, properly thought of as a forum for open discussion, so that
significant voices will be excluded and listeners will be led to believe not
merely that alternative voices are wrong, but that they are not even worthy of
being heard?
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